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Food policy often depends on markets and markets depend on institutions. But how good do institutions have to be before reforms can be launched? Relying on well timed surveys of agricultural prices and a joint study by the Government of Bulgaria and the World Bank on agricultural market institutions, this paper presents evidence that performance in food markets improved following significant policy reforms in Bulgaria, although public institutions remained weak. This suggests that even though strong institutions are preferred to weak This paper-a product of the Sustainable Rural and Urban Development Team, Development Research Group-is part of a larger effort in the department to understand how policies affect food markets in developing countries. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at DLarson@ worldbank.org. ones, it can be costly and impractical to delay policy reforms until work on strengthening institutions is finished. Still, measured performance varied by place and by commodity, suggesting that markets developed at different tempos and that the distribution of benefits from improved markets was uneven. This points to the need to address the costs of adjustment as policies change. The paper introduces a new approach to measure market performance based on composite-error techniques.
THE PERFORMANCE OF FOOD MARKETS IN TRANSITION: THE CASE OF BULGARIA 1 Introduction
Even though governments intervene in food markets in significant ways, most food policies rely substantively on markets. Within a given policy framework, markets are called upon to signal incentives and to price risk. In addition, market outcomes are often used to measure the success of policy. For many countries this current reliance on markets represents a transition from earlier regimes in which the state took primary responsibility for pricing and sometimes for the physical distribution of food. The focus of this paper, Bulgaria's decision to reduce direct interventions in food markets in favor of a market-reliant system, is a case in point and illustrates a prevalent feature of shifting economic policies during the latter half of the twentieth century.
In the transitional economies of Eastern Europe and countries of the former Soviet Union, the shift to market-based food systems was part of a comprehensive restructuring of national and regional economies. The reforms, and especially the reforms to agriculture, were pursued with varying levels of completeness that reflected uneven political consensus and differences in donor leverage. Nevertheless, more than a decade after the reforms were begun, there remains a commonly expressed view that the costs of adjustment were higher than expected and the benefits of reform slow in arriving because the markets upon which the new policies depended were not up to the task. 1 This criticism relates to the ability of governments to implement reforms, but is more fundamental.
Specifically, a reasonable argument is made that, since efficient markets rely heavily on effective publicly backed institutions, the potential benefits of market-based reforms cannot be fully realized until market-supporting institutions can be built up. And, while market reforms often create new incentives and new opportunities, institutions related to property rights, contract enforcement and dispute resolution remain largely the province of governments that are subject to other incentives and competing demands. For this reason, some argue that the pace of reform should be slowed to match an adequate build-up of public institutions. 2 To make this policy practical, some indication of the readiness of markets is needed. 3 Assessing the capacity of public institutions may not directly reveal the ability of markets to perform however since there is good reason to think that the building up of markets is partly an endogenous 1 See, for example, Kydd and Dorward (2001) and references therein. 2 Ashley and Maxwell (2001) argue that institutions need to be in place before market-dependent policies are introduced. Maxwell (2005) includes a related discussion with reference to the rural development strategies of the European Union, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the International Fund for Agricultural Development and the World Bank 3 The same could be said for the readiness of institutions. Using examples from Bulgaria, Dimitrova (2002) discusses the difficulties of basing policy on judgments about institutions in the context of EU enlargement.
process in which participants find effective ways to make use of existing limited institutions and, importantly, to build substitutes for public institutions based on private associations and private networks. To the degree that this is so, market reforms that rely on imperfect private substitutes for public institutions may nevertheless create expanded opportunities for trade.
Against this background, our paper takes up the question of whether policy reforms that create new incentives and opportunities can give rise to better performing markets, even when public institutions remain weak. The paper relies on three well timed surveys of agricultural prices in Bulgaria. The first survey took place in 1995 just prior to the 1996 economic crises that would eventually result in a new government and new policies. The second took place in 1997 just prior to a series of agricultural policy reforms that led to the full liberalization of agricultural prices in 1998.
The third took place in 2001, following a four-year period when agricultural policies were stable and market-based, but when related institutions remained weak. We also introduce a simple way to measure changes in the performance of spatial markets when information on the underlying determinants of transfer costs is unavailable.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes events and policies related to food market reforms in Bulgaria during the study period. In section 3, a conceptual model is developed to describe markets that range in their level of completeness and efficiency and an applied version of the model is specified. The data is discussed in section 4. Section 5 contains estimation and simulation results and section 6 concludes.
Background
Following the fall of the communist government in 1989, Bulgaria began a process of integrating its economy and institutions with the European Union. Eventually in this process, Bulgarian policy would focus on the transformation of institutions and the building-up of administrative capacity, driven largely by the need to take up and implement the European Union's acquis communautaire as a condition of EU membership (Preston 1997; Dimitrova 2002) . However, for most of the period between 1989 and the start of negotiations for EU membership in 2000, policy reform in Bulgaria, though uneven, centered on freeing up markets and building private ownership rather than developing institutions. This is particularly evident in the related set of policies that influenced food markets during the seven year period covered in this study. 4 Political uncertainty marked much of the first decade of reform in Bulgaria and this was reflected in uncertain and inconsistent economic policies. Early on, as the restructuring of the economy began and unemployment rose, many Bulgarians retreated into the agricultural sector, where labor productivity fell and on-farm production strategies shifted to emphasize subsistence. In February 1991, a transitional coalition government launched a broad set of policy changes that included agricultural trade and price liberalization with the intention of boosting food supplies.
However, the policies were rendered ineffectual by subsequent interventions, beginning a six-year period of irresolute policy-making. During this time, food policies were short-lived and uncertain.
For example, a long-standing policy of fixing prices for basic agricultural commodities was lifted in 1991, but a series of alternative controls were soon adopted in order to slow raising food costs. The controls included minimum procurement prices and recommended retail prices. In 1993 ceiling prices were introduced. In 1995, a State Fund for Agriculture was established and charged with stabilizing prices, although the Fund was given insufficient resources to do so.
By 1996, little progress had been made toward key reforms to Bulgaria's agriculture sector and the state remained a dominant player in the domestic grain market. Private markets were hindered by erratic sales and purchases from the State Grain Reserves, a lack of uniform grades and standards, and an ever changing trade regime characterized by ad hoc export bans thrown up in response to changing food prices (Mergos et al., 2001 (World Bank, 2002) . 7 Other sectors important to food markets were subject to inconsistent policies and an incomplete reform process. See, for example, Miller and Petranov (2000) .
intended to support already-begun policy reforms and to additionally strengthen a set of institutions judged to be weak. More specifically, the loan backed efforts to strengthen laws and property rights related to agricultural land and forest lands situated on private property. The loan also included provisions design to facilitate the privatization of food processing and related state-owned enterprises, and to put in place legal and regulatory frameworks related to: seed, fertilizer and pesticide markets; inventory-based financing (through warehouse receipts); and irrigation systems. between 1997 (World Bank, 2006a . Excise taxes on gasoline, initially low, were raised in 1996 and the phase-out of less expensive leaded gas began in 1998 (Malý, Jakubes, Jilková and Snajdrová, 2002) . 10 The law mandated the separation of the Bulgarian State Railway into two separate enterprises; one in charge of infrastructure and the second in charge of freight and passenger services. 11 Roughly 19,000 of the 37,000 kilometers of Bulgaria's roads are national roads managed by the Road Executive Agency (REA). The remaining roads are managed locally by cities and towns. 12 Policies to insure targeted funding for road maintenance were slow to emerge, although a significant step was taken with the establishment of a vignette system in 2004. 
The model
Descriptively, the model starts with the notion that, at any point in time, commodities are stored and offered for sale at spatially diverse locations. The locations are connected by information and distribution systems that collectively comprise a market network. Associated with the network are sets of pair-wise transfer costs relating geographically distinct markets. Some components of overall transaction costs relate to distance or other fixed characteristics of the trading pair. Other components relate to specific characteristics of the traded commodity, such as storability or the ease by which quality can be determined. Other aspects, such as changes in policy, relate to time.
Consequently, spatial, temporal and commodity characteristics are expected to play a role in determining observed price spreads. The estimation strategy then is to separate out the components of markets that remain fixed and unaffected by policy from the components that policy can change.
When competition is sufficient and when trade takes place, the difference between two prices for the same good should differ by no more than the full cost of transacting an exchange between the markets. Consequently, any equilibrium outcome among markets will be characterized by the multiple idiosyncratic relationships between trading partners that reflect location specific storage and transaction costs. From the perspective of an agent operating in a specific location, this solution presents itself in the form of a large number of potential trading relationships, only a few of which are actualized.
Although the general equilibrium outcome among markets at a given point in time is described by the pair-wise price conditions, a variety of factors condition the general multi-market optimization problem. Significant policy reform can change the general problem and consequently
give rise to different patterns of trade. In the instance of trade reform, this comes about because trade patterns that are optimal may have been previously precluded by policy. Policy is expected to directly and indirectly affect transfer costs as well since some components of transfer costs are public or club goods. For example, institutional changes, whether induced by changing incentives or supported through policy, are expected to lower transaction costs, especially those related to contracts and information, and in the longer term, to improve the environment for cost-reducing private investments. Similarly, complementary public investment in infrastructure can reduce transfer costs as well.
Even so, more efficient trade does not mean that observed price differences between market locations will necessarily decline or that movements in prices will be more closely correlated. It can be the direct goal of market-constraining policies to minimize price differences among regions and price variation can also be an outcome of monopolistic pricing. Additionally, indirect effects from other market reforms --for example a reducing in fuel subsidies --can increase transfer costs and lead to wider price margins.
Nevertheless, food policies are most often incentive-based and reforms are undertaken with the expectation that spatial markets will be less isolated and price transmission across markets will improve. With these policy objectives in mind, the applied model below is designed to measure general indications of these types of change.
Applied model
As discussed, for a given set of initial conditions, a set of trade relationships emerge among trading partners. Though the eventual pattern of trade is determined taking into account the entire set of potential trading relationships, the relationship between any two locations can be described by the spatial arbitrage inequality. 15 When the storage condition is met, this inequality can be expressed in one of three ways for each market dyad. In the first instance, the following arbitrage equality holds:
where is the lowest cost of transfer between locations 1 and 2 and where, in general, . In the second case, the following condition holds:
where 12  is a positive slack variable. In this case, trade does not take place because demand in location 1 can be met in less costly ways. A third possible outcome is written as where , or equivalently as:
 is also a non-zero slack variable representing missed arbitrage opportunities or constraints that prevent the use of least-cost transfer techniques. 16 From the perspective of a given set of price dyads , where , the potential relationships can be summarized in terms of a single price-distance equation:
where at least one of the slack variables equals zero at a given point in time, so that
. Were transfer costs easily measured, a solution describing the optimal distribution of supplies across markets and associated slack variables could be found using a variety of programming algorithms. Alternatively, when observations on the determinants of * T are available, it may be possible to estimate an approximating function.
In the empirical section that follows, we consider price distances relationships across several regions and several commodity markets, and this requires a slightly extended notation. For the purposes of developing the applied model, we denote a particular spatial market relationship by the triad , where represent the location of a potential exporting community, where represent the location of a potential importing community, and c represents a commodity. We set up the problem from the perspective of an importing agent who chooses among several potential sources of supply for a particular commodity. Defining market clusters , we represent the associated price distance between any two locations at a given time
, for all where
15 Most modern models of spatial integration are derived from Samuelson's (1952) formalization of Enke's (1951) descriptive solution and subsequent extensions by Takayama and Judge (1964) . 16 Constraints related to storage markets can also produce this outcome, although we rule out this possibility by using prices that are observed together with available supplies. See Larson (2007) for a unified discussion of storage and spatial arbitrage conditions. Brennan, Williams and Wright (1997) for a numerical example of how storage and production seasonality can affect trading patterns.
It is worth emphasizing that the subscript s denotes combinations of location and commodity characteristics that remain fixed in the analysis.
With this notation in place and the above discussion in mind, the set of equilibrium outcomes can be written as: 
In anticipation of future discussions, note that arbitrage forces will work to minimize  but not  . Consequently, when all spatial arbitrage opportunities are exploited,  is non-negative.
Moreover, note that when markets become more integrated in the sense that arbitrage takes place among a larger number of market pairings, the number of observations for which
Dealing with missing information on transfer costs
In practice, researchers often have observations on prices at different locations and information on a set of policies expected to affect trade and transfer costs. However, the full set of transportation, transaction and transformation costs that comprise transfer costs are difficult to observe directly and the underlying determinants of transaction costs are observed partially. Consequently, a key component of market integration studies is a strategy to deal with missing information on transfer costs or their determinants. In general this is done by describing the variation in spatial price distances through time. In some cases, the measured price difference is conditional on a partial list of observed determinants -for example transport costs. But most commonly the effects of policy are expected to work through unobserved determinants. The purpose of the modeling effort then is to describe the variation in price distances through time to determine whether outcomes are consistent with the expected policy outcomes. A practical consequence is that most empirical studies of spatial markets are based on the temporal price variation centered on a particular price-pair, or a set of price-pairs. 18 In terms of the general notation adopted above, the focus of many pair-wise studies is the between-time relationship , where the spatial relationship is fixed and
17 Put somewhat differently, prices are more often transmitted from one market to the next when the number of pairings with zero-valued slack variables increases. 18 Fackler and Goodwin (2001) provide a good review of the time-series models and results. See also recent studies by Negassa and Myers (2007) and by Balcombe, Bailey and Brooks (2007) 
are modeled using a half-normal distribution -which provides a way of estimating the probability that prices remain within the boundaries associated with transfer costs or outside them. In some models, an additional structure is imposed on the ) (t  to test whether there are tendencies for prices outside of the two thresholds to move back to threshold levels with time.
Pair-wise threshold models are well suited to studying discontinuities along major trading routes and the seasonality of agricultural markets. However, they are less well suited to studying policy shifts that are expected to remove constraints on trade or significantly affect transfer costs. This is because, as discussed, such policies are likely to engender new trade relationships. In such cases, trade between a given pair may be discontinuous because of events in other markets even when transfer costs are unchanged. 19 Said differently, in times of significant policy shifts, changes in the  may be partly or fully determined by events in other markets. In this case, the location of the relevant boundary points can shift as can any systemic auto-regressive patterns related to  .
In this paper, we employ a modified threshold strategy that considers relative price differences among clusters of markets. The approach provides a way to jointly estimate the location of the boundary points and implied transfer costs in multiple markets and provides a measure of how market performance has changed over time. The logic behind the strategy is illustrated in figure 1 , which represents the relationship between the equilibrium price in an importing center and prices in potential exporting centers . In the first case, the price arbitrage condition holds exactly, and the price distance exactly equals the associated transfer cost . In the second market, also lies on the transfer cost frontier, but is measured with error . The third observation lies beyond the frontier by a distance , which is made up of the slack variable 
Statistical specification
With this in mind, first note that when transfer costs are approximated,
, where e is an estimation error. In this case the estimated boundary condition becomes . Since
 nor are observed, the distance from the boundary condition can be thought of as a comprised error containing the non-negative idiosyncratic term e  and a random error term . As it turns out, the components of the comprised error can be separately estimated, based on an assumption about the underlying distributions. In our applied model, we continue to maintain the usual boundary-model assumption that e  can be approximated using the half-normal distribution.
This, in addition with the assumption that approximations of the threshold point contain an error that is distributed normally, results in composite normal-half-normal specification for .
e v
The amount of information contained in price data alone is limited and it is useful to describe the sources of variation in our panel of markets more precisely. Following Mundlak (1978) 
The relationship is axiomatic and exhausts the variation in . However, the relationships can also be exploited to say something about the distribution of unobserved components, since variation in price distances are decomposed into average time-invariant effects across markets, , that are separated from the systemic and idiosyncratic components that change with time, and respectfully. For the purposes of evaluating policy, the above decomposition distinguishes between differences that have to do with fixed characteristics of the market pairs and those that potentially vary with policy and time. our model, this is most likely when the model is applied to large liquid markets, where the arbitrage condition is expected to hold as an equality. 21 In the general case, when the arbitrage condition sometimes holds as an inequality, it is possible to find better estimates, conditional on an additional assumption about the distribution of the idiosyncratic slack variables.
With this in mind, we estimate a generalized version of 3.6:
where e v   
, and where and . Specified in this way, the model can be estimated using stochastic frontier estimation techniques.
Note that 3.6 is a special case of 3.7 that holds when . Non-parametric programming techniques can also be used to estimate 3.7, although Coelli et al. (2005) discuss reasons why the approach used in this paper is preferred when the are stochastic.
Caveats
Before proceeding to a description of the data, it is useful to introduce two potential problems that are addressed in the empirical section. The first has to do with the prevalence of opportunities for spatial arbitrage. The modeling approach relies on the assumption that the idiosyncratic slack variables are largely positive in order to separate the idiosyncratic asymmetric  from the random .
Unexploited arbitrage opportunities result in negative slack variables and if they are frequent in the data, the distinction between the two idiosyncratic terms in the composite error blurs. From the perspective of the estimated model, the issue can be viewed as part of the more general problem of specifying an appropriate composite error. The general problem is much discussed in the stochastic frontier literature and related statistical tests have been devised to resolve the issue empirically. We return to this topic when presenting the empirical results. e The second issue concerns unobserved markets. As discussed, when not all price relationships are observed, there is potential for misidentifying the price relationships that define the trade boundaries. This is an ever-present problem in spatial pricing studies. Making use of clusters of spatial prices arguably makes more extensive use of information about relative pricing. Even so, this does not preclude the possibility that key market relationships are missing. At root is whether or not the data generated by the underlying surveys is sufficiently detailed to support the analysis. This concern cannot be completely resolved; however, as a precaution, we employ bootstrapping methods when generating standard errors for key parameters, which allows us to check whether the results derived from the available data are sensitive to the random exclusion of markets within our sample.
Data
As mentioned, prices used in this study were taken from the 1995, 1997 Table 2 reports average price distances by region and by year. Very generally, the average calculated price distances fall from 1995 to 2001, although not in uniform fashion. 24
Empirical results
As discussed in section 3, the variation in the price distances can be decomposed into between and within components using standard regression or analysis of variation techniques, under the assumption that the within-market-time effects are normally distributed. The composition of the sums-of-squares is reported in table 3. Taken together, the between effects account for more than two-thirds of the overall variation in the sample; however, most of this is from the variation in the between-market component, , which reflects the variation in fixed location and commodity characteristics. The policies of interest are general in that they apply to all markets in the study, so our primary interest lies with how price differences change with time. to do with the chosen specification. The first is a test of the composite-error assumption against the alternative that the errors are symmetrically distributed. The test is due to Schmidt and Lin (1984) and is especially useful since it can serve as the basis of a test of the composite-error assumption that is separate from additional assumptions about the specific form of the composed error. Coelli (1995) proposed a more convenient form of the test, used here, based on the observation that the residuals from an OLS regression will be skewed if the underlying model has a composite-error structure. The test score, reported in the table, takes the expected sign and is significant, lending support assumption that the residuals are a mix of random errors and non-negative slack variables. In the context of the conceptual model, the results are consistent with a distribution of market outcomes containing a mix of the conditions 3.1 and 3.2; the results are inconsistent with a set of markets dominated by missed arbitrage opportunities as described by equation 3.3 or by a set of fully As discussed, a concern in any type of test of the efficiency of spatial markets based on price pairs is that third markets influencing the price outcomes have been omitted from the analysis and that this omission potentially leads to inferential errors. Although we cannot compensate for information about markets that are missing, we test the sensitivity of the results to excluded markets in the context of the sample by randomly excluding some markets and repeating the analysis in a The model also provides estimates of the idiosyncratic slack variables, which together with information about relative price changes, can be used provide some insight about differences in individual market outcomes among the three periods. Recall from the earlier discussion that food market reforms of the type undertaken by Bulgaria are expected to lead potentially to different patterns of internal trade and to an improved integration of markets. For any given market pair and commodity, this might mean a reversal of trade flows or possibly a cessation of trade. In terms of the model, this might mean that the inequality reverses or the value of the associated slack variable,
, might switch from zero to a positive value or both changes might occur together. This makes the equilibrium outcome for any particular market pairing unpredictable.
However, in general, market reforms are expected to reduce the disparity in spatial market outcomes, which, in turn, implies that the distribution of the idiosyncratic slack variables should shift toward zero.
As discussed, the sample is unbalanced in that the same triads of commodity and location pairings do not appear in each survey round. This is potentially due to location-specific stock-outs, but is also reasonably attributed to sampling outcomes. The 1,988 observations are based on 939 unique triads. Of these, 299 are observed in all survey rounds. 27 Implied trade reversals are common.
Among the 299 repeating triads, the location at which a higher price was observed switch in 124 markets between 1995 and 1997 and in 115 markets between 1997 and 2001, with The second is the average squared value of the slack variable, which corresponds to the average squared distance from the trading frontier.
The predicted slack variables indicate that, once the fixed market effects and the timedifference in transaction costs are taken into account, differences among the survey years in the average value of the slack variables are small. This is true of the overall sample and also of the subsample of repeatedly observed markets. The distribution of the slack variables does appear to be more concentrated with time however, as the average squared distance measure falls. This indicates that with time, the distribution of slack variables became more concentrated and more closely bunched near zero. This can also be seen in figure 1 , where the density distributions of the estimated slack variables of the repeating triads are graphed by survey year. The results are notionally consistent with improved market integration, as the tail of the distribution attenuates with time.
Taken together, the estimation results indicate that food market performance improved on average as policies implemented in 1998 as average transfer costs fell and as a larger number of markets appeared to integrate. 28 Even so, the results also indicate shifting trade patterns and a significant remaining heterogeneity in outcomes. 27 Of the remaining unique triads in the sample, 189 are observed once and 451 are observed twice. 28 The finding complements results from a study by Feinberg and Meurs (2005) . Using industry-level data, the authors provide evidence that market reforms in Bulgaria were associated with greater integration between domestic and international markets.
Regional and commodity outcomes
A key attribute of the model specification is that it provides a parametric test of how, in general, markets change over time. This is useful, since the tests provide a way to broadly evaluate the effects of policy. At the same time, the statistical test necessarily compresses information about heterogeneous local outcomes in order to judge a national trend. However, behind general trends heterogeneous local outcomes are expected since the determinants of transfer costs include factors that are specific to commodities and locations.
As discussed, the applied model provides specific predictions for each commodity and market pair at each point in time. Because the market-commodity effects, s , are fixed and the time effects are common to all markets, predicted values are spatially heterogeneous, but rise and fall systematically with time due to the time-effects. However, associated with each observation are idiosyncratic predicted slack variables and these provide an additional component of spatial-temporal heterogeneity.
The degree to which these sources of heterogeneity lead to different outcomes is illustrated in the regional and commodity averages of the predicted price distances given in tables 4 and 5. The predicted transfer costs suggest that the terms of trade between regions and the relative price of traded commodities were affected unevenly by both the disruptions of the late 1990s and the subsequent market reforms. For example, the model indicates that transfer costs fell from period to period in Sofia, albeit at differing rates. In contrast, transfer costs appeared to rise sharply and then decline sharply in Lovetch. The differences may be partly tied to the bundle of underlying commodities observed, since there is large variation in the average predicted transfer costs among commodities. For example, the predicted transfer costs associated with bread remained fairly constant, while many of the predicted transfer costs associated with fresh vegetables changed more dramatically. Collectively, these results illustrate that outcomes from the changes in policy regimes were disparate, even though market performance improved on average in measurable ways.
Conclusions
Following widespread economic disorder, the Government of Bulgaria began in 1998 a series of market reforms that included a retreat from previous interventions in domestic food markets.
Though the new policies relied heavily on markets, few direct steps were taken to build up the institutions and practices upon which markets depend. Nevertheless, results from the previous section provide evidence that spatial food market performance improved in Bulgaria between 1997 and 2001 following a period of consistent and market-reliant food and transport policies and that food markets functioned better in 2001 than in 1995. Moreover, while the results indicate the importance of macroeconomic stability for food market performance, there is no evidence to suggest that the observed changes in market margins simply marked a return to earlier performance levels following the economic disruptions of 1996.
Because the improvement in market performance coincided with the introduction of marketreliant reforms and consistent food policy, but took place during a period when related institutions were judged to be weak, the finding is consistent with the notion that some market institutions are endogenous and that, in some cases, there are measurable benefits to consistent policies alone. This speaks against delaying reforms until market-backing public institutions are judged to be strong.
Even so, the estimated changes in market performance are spatially uneven and it may well be the case that this measured heterogeneity is partly related to an uneven evolution of market institutions and related public investments. To the extent this is so, the results suggest that the weak performance of institutions can contribute to an unintended consequences in the distribution of the benefits and costs of reform. Moreover, when privately provided institutions are inferior to public institutions, any potential gains from good policy will be constrained. Consequently, policy makers will need to strike a difficult balance of pacing reforms, building up supporting market institutions and putting in place safety nets where markets are weak.
From a methodological perspective, the results suggest heterogeneous rates of market development, as expressed in the idiosyncratic components of the model. Consequently, methods that impose a fixed dynamic on how prices adjust to policy may produce misleading results.
Moreover, the observed pattern of relative price changes and the predicted differences in relative transaction costs are consistent with shifting patterns of internal trade. This is especially important since many studies of spatial markets rely on observations over time of a limited number of markets and on time series approaches where fixed rates of adjustment are assumed. 
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